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I. INTRODUCTION

In late 2012 and early 2013, tainted steroid shots from the New
England Compounding Center ("NECC") caused fifty-five deaths and
745 cases of fungal meningitis in twenty states.' On October 1, 2012,
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") inspected NECC and
found vials of steroids filled with enough floating contamination to be
visible to the human eye. 2 These NECC steroid shots were distributed
primarily to treat back pain, but the patients who received them were
injected with foreign matter containing the deadly fungi Exserohilum
rostratum or Aspergillus fumigatus.3 The earliest reported death from
fungal

meningitis

caused by NECC

was

seventy-eight-year-old

Kentucky Circuit Judge Eddie C. Lovelace. 4 Judge Lovelace received
three tainted steroid shots in July and August of 2012.5 In September,
after experiencing confusion and dizziness, Judge Lovelace collapsed
in his driveway on his way to pick up the morning paper.6 Fungal
meningitis from the shots had spread to Judge Lovelace's brain and

caused a stroke.7 He passed away on September 17, 2012, just five
days after the collapse.8 When such incidents of fungal meningitis
became more widespread, the public and Congress demanded answers
1. The Fungal Meningitis Outbreak: Could It Have Been Prevented?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 112th Cong.
(2012) [hereinafter House Hearing] (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r, Food & Drug
Administration); Multistate Fungal Meningitis Outbreak Investigation, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hailoutbreaks/meningitis.html (last updated Aug. 5,
2013).

2.

Denise Grady et al., In a Drug Linked to a Deadly Meningitis Outbreak, a Question of

Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/health/news-analysisa-question-of-oversight-on-compounding-pharmacies.html.
3.
Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Compounding Errors, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.nejm.org/doilfull/10.1056/NEJMel213569.

4.

Adam Tamburin, Meningitis Outbreak's First Victim Likely Was Kentucky Judge,

TENNESSEAN (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.tennessean.com/article/20121005/NEWS07/310060004/.

5.

Elizabeth Cohen, Wife 'Heartbroken' at Death Blamed on Meningitis, CNN (Oct. 16,

2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/15/health/meningitis-lovelace/index.html.

6.
7.

Id.
Id.

8.

Id.
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from the FDA regarding its oversight of compounding pharmacies. 9
How could such a devastating outbreak occur on the FDA's watch?
Moreover, how could the agency explain its failure to take action after
it sent a warning letter to NECC in 2006 regarding similar concerns?10
The FDA has described pharmacy compounding as "an age-old
practice

in which pharmacists combine ... ingredients to create

unique medications that meet specific needs of individual patients.""
Indeed, the longstanding importance of compounding is illustrated by
the very symbol of the pharmacy: the mortar and pestle.12 Traditional
compounding pharmacies are small-scale operations that meet specific
patient needs that commercially manufactured drugs cannot meet,
such as preparing a drug in liquid rather than tablet form for a child
who cannot swallow pills.'3 Other noncommercial formulations created
by traditional compounding pharmacies involve removing allergens,
dyes, or preservatives from products, changing doses, or adding
flavoring to a product. 14 The unique medications are traditionally
created only upon receiving a prescription from a physician or other
authorized prescriber.15 Historically, these traditional compounding
pharmacies have been regulated by state pharmacy boards. 6
Traditional compounding pharmacies differ from commercial
drug manufacturers, which are characterized by extensive product
development, high-volume drug production, distribution of drugs
without prescriptions, and sophisticated marketing techniques. In the
early 1990s, however, some large-scale compounding pharmacies
9.

Id.; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR, & PENSIONS, 112TH CONG., REP. ON

THE NEW ENGLAND COMPOUNDING CTR. AND THE MENINGITIS OUTBREAK OF 2012: A FAILURE TO
ADDRESS RISK TO THE PUB. HEALTH 11 (2012), available at http://www.help.senate.gov/
imo/media/do/11_15_12%20HELP%2OStaff%2OReport%20on%2OMeningitis%200utbreak.pdf
('The Committee will continue its investigation to determine how this tragic failure of oversight
occurred, and how it can best be prevented in the future.").
10. FDA Warning Letter to New England Compounding Center (Dec. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2006/ucm076196.htm.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IS IT REALLY FDA
APPROVED? 2 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/Consumer
Updates/UCM143301.pdf.
12. Joseph L. Fink III, Compounding Versus Manufacturing in Pharmacy Practice: A
Regulatory Challenge, 8 J. PHARM. PRAC. 103, 103 (1995).
13.

INT'L ACAD.

OF COMPOUNDING

PHARMACISTS,

THE

INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY

OF

COMPOUNDING PHARMACISTS RESPONDS TO MENINGITIS OUTBREAK TIED TO COMPOUNDING
PHARMACY
1
(2012), available at http://www.iacprx.org/associations/13421/files/IACP
%20Responds%20to%2OMeningitis%200utbreak%2ORelease%200ctober%202012.pdf.
14.

Id.

15. Id.
16. Jesse M. Boodoo, Compounding Problems and Compounding Confusion: Federal
Regulation of Compounded Drug Products and the FDAMA Circuit Split, 36 AM. J.L. & MED.
220, 230 (2010).
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arose.17 These so-called "pirate manufacturers" develop and distribute
drugs in large quantities to many states under the guise of pharmacy
compounding.18 After receiving a state license as a compounding
pharmacy, the pirate manufacturers regularly deliver drugs without
having a patient-specific prescription from a physician.19 Pirate
manufacturers seek compounding licenses from state pharmacy
boards to avoid registering with the FDA as a drug manufacturer. 20 In
this way, these entities sidestep the expensive and rigorous FDA
premarket approval process that drug manufacturers are required to
follow. 2 1 Fundamentally, pirate manufacturers engage in large-scale
compounding akin to the practices of full-fledged manufacturers, while
masquerading as traditional small-scale compounders overseen
merely by state pharmacy boards. 22
The development and distribution of drugs by pirate
manufacturers significantly amplifies the inherent risks in pharmacy
compounding. 23 Whereas the FDA's premarket approval process
requires drug manufacturers to establish the safety, efficacy, strength,
quality, and purity of products, compounding pharmacies are subject
only to the limited requirements of state pharmacy boards, which do
not include premarket testing.24 Without the FDA's premarket
approval process, compounded medications pose serious risks. 25
Physicians often determine that the benefits of meeting the specific
needs of an individual patient outweigh these risks, but all of these
inherent dangers are exponentially amplified when pirate
manufacturers produce and distribute large quantities of drugs. 26
Whereas an improperly mixed drug from a traditional compounding
pharmacy would harm only the single patient receiving the drug, an
improperly mixed drug from a pirate manufacturer could harm
thousands of patients.27 Indeed, the fungal meningitis outbreak in

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 362 (2002).
Boodoo, supra note 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 229-30.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 225.

25.

Id.; Kevin Outterson, Regulating Compounding PharmaciesAfter NECC, NEw ENG. J.

MED. (Nov. 22, 2012), available at http://www.nejm.org/doilfull/10.1056/NEJMpl212667.
26. Boodoo, supra note 16, at 230.
27. United States v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1401, 1409 (7th Cir. 1990) ("A drug
improperly compounded on a large scale will harm more patients than the same compounding
mistake made on a smaller scale.").

2013]1

SEEING THRO UGH THE MURKY VIAL

1613

2012-13 shows how contamination from only one compounding
pharmacy can lead to deadly consequences on a large scale.28
Whether the FDA could have prevented this meningitis
outbreak necessarily depends upon the scope of its authority to
regulate compounding pharmacies like NECC. The NECC was
producing large volumes of compounded steroid shots without
prescriptions and thus can hardly be described as a traditional
compounding pharmacy. Instead, the operations of the NECC more
closely resembled pirate manufacturing. FDA Commissioner Dr.
Margaret Hamburg testified at a Senate hearing that due to the
complex statutory and regulatory framework governing the FDA, the
FDA's authority over pirate manufacturers like NECC was "limited,
unclear, and contested," 29 to which a Senator quipped, "Well that's a
hell of an authority."30 Dr. Hamburg's tepid response was also
challenged by a former FDA Chief Counsel who claimed that the "FDA
already has all the authority they need to go after the [NECCs] of the
world. I'm honestly shocked by how FDA is now downplaying its
authority in this regard."31 Key players in this arena are likewise
divided; some call for a new statute, while others find that
unnecessary.32
Despite this confusion, there are enough indications in the
FDA's current statutory and regulatory framework to help resolve the
scope of the agency's authority to regulate pirate manufacturers like
NECC. This framework began with the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act
("FDCA") in 1938 and was further developed through guidance
documents, the 1997 Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act ("FDAMA"), a Supreme Court decision invalidating a provision of
the FDAMA, and a circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits

28. Multistate Fungal Meningitis Outbreak Investigation,supranote 1.
29. Pharmacy Compounding.-Implications of the 2012 Meningitis Outbreak: HearingBefore
the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing], available at http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=5f5defmd-5056-a0325297-eab57634d209 (exchange occurring at 1:09:55 on the video).
30. Id. (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r, Food & Drug Admin.).
31. Matthew Perrone, FDA Regulation of Pharmacies Has Knotty History, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 12, 2012, 8:56 PM), http:/Ibigstory.ap.org/article/fda-regulation-pharmacies-hasknotty-history.
32. Patrick Howley, Moderate Republican, Dem Lawmakers Plan to Expand the FDA, DAILY
CALLER (Dec. 18, 2012, 12:54 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/12/18/moderate-republican-demlawmakers-plan-to-expand-the-fdal (Senators and Representatives called for a statute that
"would give the FDA broad new regulatory powers over the entire compounding industry."); id.
("[Piharmacies are already regulated fairly strictly. This is not a problem that arose from a lack
of regulation.").
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over the scope of the Supreme Court's decision. 33 At the very least,
defining the FDA's authority under the current statutory scheme will
help determine whether or not a new federal statute is needed.3 4
This Note analyzes whether the FDA can regulate and enforce
actions
against large-scale
drug compounders
acting as
manufacturers. Part II will briefly explain the FDA's statutory and
regulatory framework in this area. Part III analyzes the FDCA, recent
court decisions, and FDA regulations and warning letters to determine
whether the FDA has authority to regulate large-scale compounders.
After demonstrating that the FDA maintains authority to regulate
large-scale compounders under the current framework and that a new
statutory authority is not required, Part IV explains why the FDA
must vigorously implement its present authority through a consistent
and effective enforcement regime.
II. BACKGROUND

This Part traverses the FDA's history of regulating
compounding pharmacies from its inception to modern day. Section A
chronicles the FDA's decision to regulate new drugs, while deferring
regulation of compounding pharmacies to state pharmacy boards.
Next, Section B explains the rise of large-scale compounding. Sections
C-E describe recent attempts by the FDA, Congress, and the federal
judiciary to deal with the problem of large-scale compounding.
Establishing the legal framework in which the FDA currently operates
is necessary to determine whether or not it maintains authority to
regulate large-scale compounding pharmacies.
A. Early FDA Regulation of New Drugs and Deference to State
Regulation of CompoundingPharmacies
Although Congress created the FDA in 1906 to regulate
misbranded and adulterated drugs, the agency was not given the
power of premarket review until 1938. That year, the country was
reeling from the Sulfanilamide public health crisis, which was at least
as devastating as the fungal meningitis outbreak of 2012.35 The
33. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 361-66 (2002); Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v.
Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 408-09 (5th Cir. 2008).
34. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 399, 408-09.
35. JEFFREY N. GIBBS & PAMELA J. FURMAN, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS AsS'N, HEALTH LAW
PRACTICE GUIDE § 16:2 (2012); JAMES T. O'REILLY & KELLIE ANN MOORE, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION § 13:74 (3d ed. 2012); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government
Regulation of Medical Products,82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1758 (1996); Outterson, supra note 25.
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Sulfanilamide disaster was caused by a Tennessee drug company that
distributed an untested, highly toxic chemical similar to antifreeze,
which resulted in over 100 deaths.36 In response, Congress expanded
the FDA's authority under the FDCA by authorizing federal
regulation of "new drugs." The 1938 FDCA amendments required
manufacturers to receive premarket approval from the FDA before
marketing any new drugs. 37
While products manufactured by drug companies were clearly
new drugs subject to the FDCA, it is less certain whether medications
created by compounding pharmacies were covered.38 At the time of the
FDCA's enactment, half of all drugs in the United States were
compounded; however, there was no mention of pharmacy
compounding in the entire Act.39 The first reference to compounding
was a brief provision added by the Drug Amendments of 1962, which
exempted pharmacies that "compound" from certain registration
requirements. 40
The FDA also ignored compounding pharmacies in practice.
For the first fifty years following the enactment of the FDCA, the FDA
relied on state pharmacy boards to regulate compounding
pharmacies. 41 Thus, throughout this fifty-year period of deference, the
question of whether the FDA actually maintained the authority to
regulate compounding pharmacies remained open. 42
Nevertheless, the FDA eventually decided to target
compounding pharmacies functioning as manufacturers. In 1978, the
FDA took action against a chain of ten Florida acne treatment clinics
that also produced medications. 43 The FDA claimed that the clinics
engaged in manufacturing rather than compounding because they
produced a large volume of drugs and compounded them on a wide-

36. GIBBS & FURMAN, supranote 35; Merrill, supra note 35.
37. Merrill, supranote 35.
38. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2012) (defining "new drug" as "[a]ny drug . .. the composition of
which .. . is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under
the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof. . ."). For more
discussion of the definition of new drug, see Boodoo, supra note 16, at 231, and infra Part III.A.1.
39. Boodoo, supra note 16, at 231 ("[The original act featured no language specifically
directed at the practice.").
40. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 7 Stat. 781; see infra Part III.B for more
discussion of the registration exemption provision.
41. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369 (2002) ("For approximately the first
50 years after the enactment of the FDCA, the FDA generally left regulation of compounding to
the states.").
42. Id. at 362.
43. Fink, supra note 12, at 105.
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scale basis, rather than for specific patients. 44 Soon thereafter, two
district court judges sided with the FDA and held that the clinics were
not exempt from FDA jurisdiction because they engaged in activities
that went far beyond traditional pharmacy practices. 45 One judge
outlined several factors that courts should use to determine whether a
pharmacy was involved in compounding or manufacturing, including
whether the firm solicited purchases, maintained significant out-ofstate business, lacked a one-on-one relationship with patients, or
offered only a single product. 46
B. The Rise of Large-Scale Compounding and the FDA's Response
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the FDA witnessed a
growing number of pharmacies engaged in large-scale drug
distribution under the guise of traditional compounding, which led the
FDA to reevaluate its quiescent role in the regulation of compounding
pharmacies.47 The FDA also observed compounding pharmacies
increase their marketing activities and begin producing exact copies of
FDA-approved drugs. 48 In 1992, the FDA responded to such practices
by issuing a Compliance Policy Guide ("1992 CPG") to compounding
pharmacies and FDA field staff that threatened to exercise the
agency's authority over these large-scale compounding pharmacies. 49
Specifically, the 1992 CPG explained that the FDA would exercise its
enforcement discretion "when the scope and nature of a pharmacy's
activity raises the kinds of concerns normally associated with a
manufacturer and that results in significant violations of the new
drug, adulteration, or misbranding provisions of the [FDCA]."
In addition to asserting the FDA's authority over compounding
pharmacies, the 1992 CPG also enumerated a list of activities that the
FDA would consider when determining whether to initiate action
against a compounding pharmacy. The nine activities included:
1. soliciting business to compound specific drugs;
2. compounding copies of FDA-approved commercial drugs;
44. Id.
45. Id. at 110.
46. Id. at 111.
47. Boodoo, supra note 16, at 232-33 ("Commentators generally cite the rise of
compounding-disguised-manufacturing as the single most important factor behind the FDA's
renewed interest.").
48. Id. at 232.
49. U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE 7132.16, MANUFACTURE,
DISTRIBUTION AND PROMOTION OF ADULTERATED, MISBRANDED, OR UNAPPROVED NEW DRUGS
FOR HUMAN USE BY STATE-LICENSED PHARMACIES, MAR. 16, 1992 [hereinafter 1992 CPG].
50. Id.
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3. using source ingredients not made in FDA-approved
facilities;
4. using source ingredients that do not meet official
compendia requirements;
5. using commercial-scale
manufacturing
or testing
equipment for compounding;
6. compounding inordinate amounts of drugs in anticipation of
receiving prescriptions relative to the amounts of drugs
compounded after receiving valid prescriptions;
7. offering compounded products at wholesale or for other
commercial entities to resale;
8. distributing inordinate amounts of compounded drugs out
of state; and
9. failing to operate in compliance with state law regulating
pharmacy practice. 5 '
The 1992 CPG concluded by listing the range of enforcement actions
available against compounding pharmacies, including warning letters,
injunctions, and criminal charges, which the FDA can take upon
discovery of any of the nine listed activities. 52
The 1992 CPG stated that traditional compounding activities,
where compounders "manipulate[] reasonable quantities of drugs upon
receipts of a valid prescription for an individually identified patient
from a licensed practitioner," were not the subject of the guidance
document.53 Nonetheless, pharmacy lobbyist groups perceived the
guidance document as a fundamental threat to professional autonomy,
representing a potentially seismic increase in federal regulation of
compounding pharmacies. 54
In reaction to the 1992 CPG, the American Pharmaceutical
Association and the International Academy of Compounding
Pharmacists lobbied Congress and the FDA to eliminate federal
oversight of compounding pharmacies.55 This campaign led to the
introduction of the Pharmacy Compounding Preservation Act of
1994.56 The bill received initial support but was ultimately defeated
due to resistance from the FDA and the Democrats in Congress 57

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.; Boodoo, supra note 16, at 233.
1992 CPG, supranote 49.
Id.
Boodoo, supra note 16, at 234; Fink, supra note 12, at 110.
Boodoo, supra note 16, at 234.
H.R. 598, 104th Cong. (1995).
Boodoo, supra note 16, at 234.

1618

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 66:5:1609

The FDA also encountered litigation relating to the validity of
the 1992 CPG itself.58 A group of pharmacies sued the FDA claiming
that the 1992 CPG was invalid because it was a "substantive rule"
issued in violation of the notice-and-comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act.59 However, in 1995, the Fifth Circuit
held that the 1992 CPG was a "policy statement" or an "interpretive
rule," neither of which needs to be promulgated through notice-andcomment rulemaking.60 In upholding the validity of the 1992 CPG, the
Fifth Circuit emphasized that the FDA issued warning letters prior to
the 1992 CPG and that the document "merely provides guidance on an
old problem-unregulated drug manufacturing."6 1 Nonetheless, in
response to public resistance to the 1992 CPG, the FDA was hesitant
to enforce the guidance document. 62
C. Congress, the Ninth Circuit,and the Supreme Court Attempt to
Clarify FDA Authority
The lobbying and litigation efforts against the 1992 CPG
prompted Congress to attempt to clarify the FDA's role in the
regulation of compounding pharmacies. After a lengthy legislative
debate, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act in 1997, which amended the FDCA. 63 The FDAMA
added § 503A to the FDCA, entitled "Pharmacy Compounding." 64 This
section sought to clarify the FDA's regulation of compounding
pharmacies whose activities went beyond the scope of traditional
pharmacy practices.65
FDCA § 503A created a narrow exemption from the Act's
regulations of new drugs for compounded drugs that satisfied seven
requirements. 66 These requirements were largely derived from the list
of nine activities identified in the 1992 CPG that the FDA considered

58. Prof'ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 593-95 (5th Cir. 1995).
59. Id. at 594.
60. Id. at 602.
61. Id.
62. Boodoo, supra note 16, at 234; Fink, supra note 12, at 110.
63. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 127,
111 Stat. 2296, 2328 (1997) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2012)).

64. Id.
65. OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN EDWARD J. MARKEY, COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES
COMPOUNDING RISK 5 (2012), available at http://interactive.snmorg/docs/Compounding
%20Pharmacies%20-%2OCompounding%2ORisk%20FINAL._O.pdf.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 353a.
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when determining whether to exercise its enforcement discretion.67
The seven requirements for exemption included the following:
1. Drugs must be compounded for an individual patient based
on a prescriber's prescription or in limited quantities before
receipt of a prescription for an individual patient where
there is an established physician-pharmacist relationship.68
2. Drugs must be compounded using approved ingredients or
bulk substances.69
3. Drugs must not be compounded that copy a drug product
that has been removed from the market for safety or
effectiveness problems.70
4. Copies of commercially available drug products must not be
compounded regularly or in inordinate amounts.71
5. Drugs must not be listed on an FDA list of drug products
that present demonstrable difficulties for compounding.72
6. The pharmacy must not distribute more than five percent of
the total prescription orders dispensed out of state.73
7. A drug may only be compounded if the pharmacy does not
advertise or promote the drug.74
FDCA § 503A created a safe harbor for traditional
compounding pharmacies that was more clearly defined than the 1992
CPG. Specifically, § 503A imposed a ceiling on out-of-state drug
distribution; any amount distributed over the five percent out-of-state
maximum caused the compounding pharmacy to lose its exemption.75
Also, § 503A allowed some anticipatory compounding for individual
patients if the pharmacy has an established relationship with the
prescribing physician, whereas the 1992 CPG stated that pharmacies
could only compound drugs upon receipt of a patient-specific
prescription. 76 The implication is that the FDA has authority to
regulate compounding pharmacies that fall outside of this safe harbor.
Almost immediately after its passage, litigants challenged the
validity of § 503A by focusing on the prohibitions on advertising and

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Boodoo, supra note 16, at 235.
21 U.S.C. § 353a(a).
Id. § 353a(b)(1)(A)-(B).
Id. § 353a(b)(1)(C).
Id. § 353a(b)(1)(D).
Id. § 353a(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 353a(b)(3)(B).
Id. § 353a(a), (c); Boodoo, supranote 16, at 235.
21 U.S.C. § 353a(b)(3)(B).
Id. at § 353a(a); 1992 CPG, supra note 49.
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promoting drugs.77 A group of compounding pharmacies sued the FDA
in 1998 claiming that the advertising restrictions violated their First
Amendment rights.78 In Western States Medical Center v. Shalala, the
Ninth Circuit sided with the pharmacies and held that the advertising
restrictions were an impermissible limitation on commercial free
speech. 79 The Ninth Circuit not only struck down the provision
restricting advertising, but it also struck down the rest of § 503A
because it determined that the requirements were interdependent.80
In 2002, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the
provisions restricting advertising violated the First Amendment, but
the Court did not explicitly rule on the severability issue.81 The Court
determined that the FDA could achieve its goal of "drawing a line
between compounding and large-scale manufacturing" through nonspeech-related means, including restricting the quantity of
compounded drugs that could be produced or restricting the use of
manufacturing equipment.82 The dissent argued that the prohibition
on advertising was constitutional and that Congress could not achieve
its safety objectives through less restrictive means.83 Furthermore, the
dissent believed that the majority undervalued Congress's interest in
protecting public health, explaining that allowing advertising would
increase the risks associated with compounded drugs, which could
cause "infection, serious side effects, or even death."84
D. A Murky Mixture: The FDA's Response to the Supreme Court and
the Fifth Circuit's Disagreementwith the Ninth Circuit
After Thompson, the FDA and compounding pharmacies
confronted a confusing and uncertain regulatory realm. Before the
Supreme Court's decision, the FDA had promulgated regulations
under § 503A, set up a Pharmacy Compounding Advisory Committee,
and sent warning letters to pharmacies based on violations of § 503A.
However, the Court's decision in Thompson forced the FDA to state

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

21 U.S.C. § 353a(a), (c).
W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1291 (D. Nev. 1999)
238 F.3d 1090, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id.
535 U.S. 357, 366, 377 (2002).
Id. at 372.
Id. at 385 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 382-83.
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that "all of section 503A is now invalid."85 In order to provide stability
and reassert authority over large-scale compounding, the FDA issued
a Compliance Policy Guide in 2002 ("2002 CPG").86 This guide was a
reissuance of the 1992 CPG with minor changes.87 The 2002 CPG
removed the two factors from the 1992 CPG that pertained to
advertising restrictions and out-of-state distribution of compounded
drugs. 8 8 In the mid-2000s, the FDA initiated enforcement activities
based on the 2002 CPG and the FDCA. 89 From the issuance of the
2002 CPG through the end of 2007, the FDA issued twenty-eight
warning letters to compounding pharmacies and conducted numerous
investigations. 90
In July 2008, the temporary stability that existed from
nationwide application of the 2002 CPG was interrupted by a Fifth
Circuit decision, Medical Center Pharmacy v. Mukasey, that
resurrected significant provisions of § 503A of the FDCA. 9 1 First, the
Fifth Circuit held that compounded drugs are covered under the
definition of new drug under the FDCA and are subject to FDA
jurisdiction. 92 The Fifth Circuit then analyzed the severability
question and, relying heavily on the existence of a severability clause
85. Boodoo, supra note 16; FDA Warning Letter to Med-Mart Pulmonary Services (Sept. 30,
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2002/
available at
2002),
ucml45144.htm; see also 21 C.F.R. § 14.100(c)(18) (1998).
86. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE § 460.200 (2002) [hereinafter
2002 CPG], available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/CompliancePolicy
GuidanceManuallucm074398.htm; FDA Warning Letter to Carneys Drug (May 27, 2003),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2003/ucml47501.ht
m ("Because of the Supreme Court decision, FDA determined that it needed to issue guidance to
the field and compounding industry on what factors the agency will consider in exercising its
enforcement discretion regarding pharmacy compounding.").
87. 2002 CPG, supra note 86; Boodoo, supranote 16, at 238.
88. 2002 CPG, supra note 86; Boodoo, supranote 16, at 238.
89. See FDA's Electronic Reading Room - Warning Letters, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/warningletters/wlSearchResult.cfm?webSearch=true&qryS
tr=pharmacy+compounding&Search=Search (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
90. Id. As of February 23, 2013, the FDA's easily accessible web page entitled "Pharmacy
Compounding: FDA Actions" included the warning letters sent to compounding pharmacies from
2002-2013. As of August 8, 2013, this web page has been changed to only include warning letters
sent to compounding pharmacies from 2008-2013. The updated web page omits the warning
letter sent to NECC in 2006. Pharmacy Compounding:FDA Actions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/PharmacyCompounding/
ucm339771.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2013). The 2002-2007 warning letters are now more
difficult to find, but are available through searching FDA's Electronic Reading Room. FDA's
ADMIN.,
FOOD
& DRUG
Warning Letters, U.S.
Electronic Reading Room http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/warningletters/wlSearchResult.cfm?webSearch=true&qryS
tr=pharmacy+compounding&Search=Search (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
91. 536 F.3d 383, 408-09 (5th Cir. 2008). Mukasey resurrected all of § 503A except for the
advertising restrictions provision that was struck down by the Supreme Court. See id.
92. Id. at 395.
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in the 1938 FDCA, ruled that the unconstitutional advertising
restrictions were severable from the rest of § 503A.93
Thus, Mukasey created a circuit split between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits over the severability issue. 94 The Fifth Circuit
determined that the non-advertising related provisions were valid and
created a narrow safe harbor for compounding pharmacies that
otherwise satisfied the requirements of § 503A. 95 In response to the
circuit split, the FDA applied § 503A in the Fifth Circuit (i.e., Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi), but in the rest of the country, it applied
the 2002 CPG. 96
E. PlacingNECC Within the Statutory and Regulatory Landscape
The 2012 meningitis outbreak that was traced to NECC
occurred in this regulatory landscape, with the Fifth Circuit governed
by § 503A and the rest of the country governed by the 2002 CPG. The
FDA's interaction with NECC first occurred in 2004 when state and
federal investigators inspected NECC facilities.97 After an additional
inspection in 2005, the FDA sent a warning letter to NECC in
December 2006, citing multiple violations of the FDCA. 98 The letter
accused NECC of violating a number of the 2002 CPG enforcement
factors by making copies of commercially available drug products and
compounding without a valid prescription (the firm allegedly told
physician offices that using a staff member's name, instead of a
patient's name, was acceptable). 99 The FDA's 2006 warning letter also
raised concerns about "potential microbial contamination" resulting
from the "manipulation of sterile products."100 After waiting almost
two years to follow up, the FDA sent NECC another warning letter
saying:
Your firm must promptly correct the violations noted in the December 4, 2006, Warning
Letter, and establish procedures to assure that such violations do not occur. Its failure
to do so may result in enforcement action including seizure of the firm's products and/or
an injunction against the firm and its principals. In a future inspection, we will confirm
the commitments that you made in your response. We also will verify that your firm's
compounding practices are consistent with the policy articulated in the CPG, and that

93. Id. at 405.
94. Id.; W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2001).
95. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 395.
96. FDA Warning Letter to Steven's Pharmacy (Nov. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2008/ucml048074.htm.
97. FDA Warning Letter to New England Compounding Center, supranote 10.
98. Id.

99. Id.
100. Id.
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your firm's operation is not otherwise at odds with the conditions under which the
101
agency exercises enforcement discretion towards pharmacy compounding.

This was the last communication before the meningitis
outbreak in 2012. Tragically, when the FDA inspected NECC after the
fungal meningitis outbreak, inspectors discovered "microbial growth"
in allegedly "sterile injectable drugs."102
So the question remains whether the FDA actually had the
authority to enforce the threats in its warning letters to NECC. The
following Part explores the answer.
III. ANALYSIS
The FDA cannot prevent public health crises like the 2012
meningitis outbreak unless it has authority to regulate compounding
pharmacies like NECC that function as manufacturers. This Part will
analyze the FDCA and recent cases to determine if, as FDA
Commissioner Hamburg opined, the agency is hampered from
confronting pirate manufacturing because its authority is "limited,
unclear, and contested." 103 First, Section A will analyze whether the
FDCA's definition of new drugs includes compounded drugs.104 Then,
Section B will determine whether the FDCA's inspection and
registration exemption provisions authorize the FDA to distinguish
between traditional compounding pharmacies and large-scale
compounders. 05
A. Are Compounded Drugs New Drugs Under the Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act of 1938?
Analyzing the text of the FDCA is integral to determining the
FDA's authority over compounding pharmacies. 06 The FDCA governs
the application process and the adulteration and misbranding
101. Memorandum from the Staff of the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce to the Members of the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce 23 (Nov. 14, 2012) [hereinafter
Oversight and Investigations Memorandum], available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/OI/20121114/HMTG-112-HHRGIF02-20121114-SDOO1.pdf.
102. FDA Inspection Letter of New England Compounding Center (Oct. 26, 2012), available
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofGlobalRegulatoryOperations
andPolicy/ORA/ORAElectronicReadingRoom/UCM325980.pdf.
103. Senate Hearing,supra note 29 (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r, Food &
Drug Administration).
104. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2012).
105. Id. §§ 374(a), 360(g).
106. Id. §§ 301-450.
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requirements for new drugs. 07 Thus, whether the FDA has
jurisdiction over compounded drugs depends on whether they are new
drugs under the FDCA. According to one view, the text of the FDCA,
and the FDA's interpretation of it, demonstrates that compounded
drugs qualify as new drugs. 08 But, according to another view,
classifying compounded drugs as new drugs would lead to the absurd
result of banning all compounded drugs.109
1. FDCA Text and the FDA's Own Interpretation Show Compounded
Drugs Are New Drugs
The text of the FDCA supports the view that compounded
drugs are new drugs that fall under the purview of the FDA. A new
drug is defined in § 201(p) of the FDCA as:
Any drug the composition of which ...

is not generally recognized, among experts

qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of

drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling thereof, except [older drugs that have been "grandfathered"
in].110

The Fifth Circuit in Mukasey clarified the definition as "'any
drug ... the composition of which' has not already been approved by
the FDA.""'
Straightforward application of this definition to pharmacy
compounding suggests that compounded drugs are new drugs. When
compounders mix ingredients to create a concoction, the final product
can be categorized as "any drug . . . the composition of which" has not

been approved by the FDA.11 2 The descriptor "any" in "any drug" is
expansive, and, as the Fifth Circuit succinctly stated, "Compounded
drugs are, after all, drugs."11 3 Because the definition of new drug
emphasizes the composition and use of a drug, the origin of the drug107. Id. §§ 321(p), 355(b), 352.
108. See Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 395 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The FDA
argues that the language of the FDCA's 'new drug' definition is both plain and expansive.").
109. See id. at 397 ("[The Pharmacies] suggest that including compounded drugs under the
FDCA's 'new drug' definition would effectively outlaw the common practice of
compounding .... ).
110. Id. (emphasis added). The provision excepting "grandfathered" older drugs states:
such a drug not so recognized shall not be deemed to be a 'new drug' if at any time
prior to June 25, 1938, it was subject to the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, as
amended, and if at such time its labeling contained the same representations
concerning the conditions of its use ....

Id.
111. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 394.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 395.
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whether from a pharmacy or manufacturer-does not appear to be
relevant. 114 Thus, if a compounder combines an approved drug with
other ingredients to create a different substance, this substance is a
new drug. 115
Furthermore, since the definition of new drug creates specific
exceptions, and since there is no specific exception for compounded
drugs, Congress most likely intended to limit the exceptions to those
enumerated. 116 The definition of new drug exempts older drugs that
were subject to the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 and that maintained
the same labeling representations they had under that regime.117 A
second exemption from the definition of new drug appears in FDCA
§ 505(i), which exempts drugs intended only for investigational use.1 1
According to a longstanding canon of statutory construction, when
Congress enumerates specific exceptions to an expansive provision,
then the proper inference is that Congress considered the issue of
exceptions and decided to limit the exceptions in the statute to those
enumerated.119 Thus, since Congress chose to exempt old drugs and
investigational drugs, no general exemption for compounded drugs can
be read into the statute.120
The FDA's practice also indicates that the agency has long
understood compounded drugs to be new drugs. In 1974, the FDA
promulgated 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h)(1)-(2), clarifying when a new drug is
created. 121 The FDA explained that the newness of a drug may arise
by reason of "the newness for a drug use of a combination of two or
more substances, none of which is a new drug," and "the newness for
drug use of any substance which composes such drug, in whole or in
part, whether it be an active substance or a menstruum, excipient,
carrier, coating, or other component." 122 Both of these provisions apply
to compounding. Under these regulations, when a pharmacist creates
a new dosage form or an emulsion, a new drug results. 123 Thus, under
the FDA's view, all compounded drugs appear to be new drugs.

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117. 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(p)(1) (2012).
118. Id. § 355(i).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

536 F.3d at 395 (citing United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000)).
Id.
21 C.F.R. § 310.3(h)(1)-(2) (1974).
Id.
Id.; Fink, supra note 12, at 106.
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FDA warning letters to compounding pharmacies also state
that compounded drugs are new drugs under the FDCA.124 The
numerous warning letters sent to compounding pharmacies in the
2000s all cite the FDCA definition of new drug as the basis of FDA's
authority.125 For example, a typical FDA warning letter to a
compounding pharmacy states: "FDCA establishes Agency jurisdiction
over 'new drugs'... . [C]ompounded drugs are 'new drugs' within the
meaning of [21 U.S.C. § 321], because they are not 'generally
recognized, among experts . .. as safe and effective' for their labeled
uses." 126 The warning letters then fortify this statement by citing
cases and stating, "There is substantial judicial authority supporting
FDA's position."127 Next, the warning letters read: "[B]ecause they are
'new drugs' under the FDCA, compounded drugs may not be
introduced into interstate commerce without FDA approval." 128
Finally, the authority section concludes by stating that the FDA will
use its enforcement discretion based on the 2002 CPG factors and that
it does not historically enforce actions against traditional
compounding pharmacies.129
Straightforward application of the FDCA's expansive definition
of new drug to the act of compounding, combined with the FDA's wellsupported position in its regulations and warning letters, suggests
that compounded drugs are "new drugs." Thus, the FDA maintains
global jurisdiction over all compounded drugs-not only the NECCs of
the world, but also traditional mom-and-pop compounding
pharmacies.130

124. See, e.g., FDA Warning Letter to New England Compounding Center, supra note 10.
125. See, e.g., FDA Warning Letter to Newman Inc. (June 24, 2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2008/ucmlO48230.htm.
126. Id.
127. Id. The Warning Letter cites Professionalsand Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala,
for additional judicial authority. 56 F.3d 592, 593 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Although the [FDCA] does
not expressly exempt 'pharmacies' or 'compounded drugs' from the new drug. . . provisions, the
FDA as a matter of policy has not historically brought enforcement actions against pharmacies
engaged in traditional compounding."); In re Establishment Inspection of: Wedgewood Vill.
Pharmacy, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 525, 543-44 (D.N.J. 2003), aff'd, Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy,
Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The FDCA contains provisions with
explicit exemptions from the new drug .. . provisions. Neither pharmacies nor compounded drugs
are expressly exempted." (citation omitted)).
128. FDA Warning Letter to Newman Inc., supra note 125.
129. Id.
130. See Bruce Patsner, Pharmacy Compounding of Bioidentical Hormone Replacement
Therapy (BHRT): A Proposed New Approach to Justify FDA Regulation of These Prescription
Drugs, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 459, 464 (2008) ("FDA would have to selectively decide when to
exercise its claimed global jurisdiction over a compounded prescription drug or class of drugs.").
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The FDA's claim of global jurisdiction over compounding
pharmacies is bolstered by the provision in the FDCA explicitly
allowing the FDA to choose not to prosecute "minor violations" of the
Act. 131 21 U.S.C. § 336 states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be
for
report
to
Secretary
the
requiring
as
construed
132
This
provision
prosecution .. . minor violations of this chapter."
explains why, despite the fact that compounded drugs are illegal new
drugs under the FDCA, the FDA can choose not to initiate
enforcement actions against traditional compounding pharmacies
without violating its responsibility under the Act. 133
Further support for the perspective that compounded drugs are
new drugs comes from analyzing how the 1997 FDAMA amendments
changed the original 1938 FDCA. Because § 503A of the FDAMA,
without the prohibitions on advertising, is still good law in the Fifth
Circuit, it can be instructive in construing the definition of new drug
in the 1938 FDCA. 134 The FDAMA created an exemption from the new
drug requirements, adulteration provisions, and misbranding
provisions for compounded drugs that are produced through
traditional compounding practices. 135 The FDAMA begins with the
premise that compounded drugs fall under the definition of new drugs,
but the statute then carves out a space for certain compounded drugs
that meet the prerequisites for the exemption. 136 This means the 1938
FDCA could not have implicitly exempted compounding pharmacies
from its purview because subsequently passing the FDAMA to create
an explicit exemption for certain pharmacies would have been
superfluous. 137 In short, the FDAMA could not have carved out a space
for compounded drugs unless the drugs were previously new drugs
under the statute.
In the three states where it applies, the FDAMA framework
limits the FDA's jurisdiction over compounded drugs by creating a
narrow exemption for pharmacies that satisfy certain requirements. 1 38
However, it does reaffirm the FDA's ability to bring enforcement
actions against compounding pharmacies that function like
manufacturers. The prerequisites for receiving the exemption require
practices, including
adherence to traditional compounding
131. 21 U.S.C.

§ 336 (2012).

132. Id.
133. Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 399 (5th Cir. 2008).
134. Id. at 401.

135. 21 U.S.C.

§ 353a.

136. Id.; Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 405.

137. 21 U.S.C.
138. 21 U.S.C.

§ 353a; Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 405.
§ 353a; Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 405.
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compounding drugs for individual patients and not compounding
copies of commercially available drugs-requirements that NECC
never would have satisfied.139
2. Pharmacies Argue that the History of FDA Enforcement and the
FDA's "Absurd" Interpretation Suggest Compounded Drugs Cannot
Be New Drugs
On the opposite extreme from the FDA's claim of global
jurisdiction lies the view that all drugs created by compounding
pharmacies are per se exempt from the definition of new drug because
such companies are licensed as pharmacies rather than
manufacturers.1 4 0 This view finds support in Medical Center
Pharmacy v. Gonzales, a district court decision which was later
reversed by the Fifth Circuit in Mukasey.141 The Gonzales court sided
with pharmacies by holding that "any drugs" created by the
compounding process were "implicitly exempt from the new drug
approval process and the definitions found in 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p)(1)
and (v)(i)."142 The district court offered no significant textual analysis
of the definition of new drug; instead, it flatly asserted that it
"examin[ed] relevant case and statutory law, as well as legislative
intent" 143 to find that compounded drugs were not "new drugs." 144
Although the Gonzales court's holding was overturned on
appeal, some commentators believe the district court's reasoningthat compounding pharmacies are not producing "new drugs" and are
per se exempt from the requirements and prohibitions of the FDCAcould gain traction and eventually threaten the FDA's jurisdiction
over compounding pharmacies. 145 This argument is supported by the
history of the FDA's regulation of compounding pharmacies, where
fifty years passed with the agency almost completely ceding

139. 21 U.S.C. § 353a; Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 405; Senate Hearing, supra note 29.
140. See Patsner, supra note 130, at 467 ("[T]here is a statutory basis ... that a pharmacy
engaged in the practice of compounding cannot, by definition, be a manufacturer, and is not
subject to the manufacturing requirements of the FDCA.").
141. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 392; Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Gonzales, 451 F. Supp. 2d 854, 868
(W.D. Tex. 2006).
142. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 409 n.20; Gonzales, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 865 (concluding that
summary judgment was "granted on [the Pharmacies'] claim that compounded drugs do not fall
under the new drug definitions").
143. Gonzales, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
144. Id. at 856 ("[A] declaration that drugs compounded by licensed pharmacists are not 'new
drugs'. . . per se under 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p)(1) and (v)(1).").
145. Boodoo, supra note 16, at 244 ("[I]f the FDA is correct in maintaining that the FDAMA
is unseverable and invalid, then the 'new drug' question is far more difficult.").
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responsibility to the states. 146 Surely, the argument goes, the FDCA
never authorized the FDA to regulate compounding pharmacies since
the FDA failed to initiate any such statutory duty for half a century. If
the FDA has global jurisdiction in this area, why did it allow
compounding pharmacies to produce drugs unfettered by federal
regulation?
While the Gonzales court provided virtually no textual or
logical arguments to support its per se exemption for compounded
drugs, a more compelling rejection of the FDA's claim of global
jurisdiction is that this broad interpretation leads to the absurd result
that all compounding is effectively illegal. 147 Since the definition of
new drug does not include an exemption carving out space for
traditional compounding pharmacies, technically, even the patientspecific medications these small operations create would be
outlawed. 148 The practice of extemporaneously compounding for
immediate patient needs seems antithetical to the rigorous and
lengthy requirements of the new drug application process.
Furthermore, it would be impossible for a local hospital or outpatient
pharmacy to spend the estimated $800 million in research-anddevelopment costs1 49 for a new drug to achieve FDA approval. Without
approval, all compounded drugs would be rendered illegal new drugs.
Given the FDA's repeated recognition of the essential role that
traditional compounding pharmacies serve in meeting patient
needs, 150 it seems absurd for the FDCA to effectively outlaw
compounded drugs as unapproved new drugs, despite its technical
language to the contrary.
Proponents of this view have cited the elephant-in-mousehole
doctrine to argue that the FDA's claim of global jurisdiction over new
drugs is untenable. 15 1 According to the elephant-in-mousehole
146. Id. at 245.
147. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 388.

148. Boodoo, supra note 16, at 232.
149. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development
Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) (estimating the total cost to bring a drug to market
through the FDA premarket approval process at $802 million).
150. See 2002 CPG, supra note 86 ("FDA recognizes that pharmacists traditionally have
extemporaneously compounded and manipulated reasonable quantities of human drugs upon
receipt of a valid prescription for an individually identified patient from a licensed practitioner.
This traditional activity is not the subject of this guidance."); FDA Warning Letter to Med-Mart
Pulmonary Services, supra note 85 ("[Tlhe agency now utilizes its longstanding policy to
recognize and exercise its enforcement discretion for extemporaneous compounding, where
reasonable quantities of drugs are manipulated upon receipt of valid prescriptions from licensed
practitioners for individually identified patients.").
151. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 397 ("The Pharmacies argue, in essence, that this is an elephantin-mousehole case.").
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doctrine, Congress does not fundamentally change a regulatory
scheme in vague terms. 152 Applied here, Congress would have
explicitly mentioned compounded drugs if it wished to broadly
regulate compounding pharmacies. Congress cannot have intended to
effectively outlaw compounded drugs through the broad and indefinite
definition of new drug. 153 Pharmacies have argued that regulating
compounded drugs through the FDCA's definition of new drug "hides
an elephant in a mousehole," just like regulating nicotine through the
FDCA's "drug" definition, which the Supreme Court deemed an
impermissible interpretation in FDA v. Brown & Williamson.154 In
that case, the Court held that even though nicotine met the FDCA's
technical definition of drug, "Congress could not have intended to
delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an
agency in so cryptic a fashion." 55 Similarly, pharmacies claim that
Congress could not have intended to outlaw compounding, a common
and widespread practice in 1938, through a broad definition of new
drug.156

In United States v. Franck's Lab, a federal district court relied
on the elephant-in-mousehole doctrine to reject the FDA's assertion of
global jurisdiction, but the court held that pharmacies that function
like manufacturers create new drugs under the FDA's purview. 15 7 The
court accepted the FDA's authority to "regulate pharmacy
compounding as a disguise for manufacturing"; however, it believed
the FDA was attempting to "expand its statutory authority by
enjoining an individual pharmacy engaged in traditional
compounding." 15 8 The court analogized Brown & Williamson and
similar cases to hold that "the elephant-in-mousehole[ doctrine is
equally applicable here: it is not at all clear that Congress meant to
hide the elephant of the FDA's regulation of traditional compounding
in the mousehole of the FDCA's new drug approval process."1 59 The
court rejected the FDA's claim of global jurisdiction over compounding

152. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) ("Congress, we have held,
does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.").
153. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 397.
154. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33 (2000); United States
v. Franck's Lab, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1241-42 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
155. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132-33.
156. Boodoo, supra note 16, at 231 ("[The original act featured no language specifically
directed at the practice.").
157. Franck'sLab, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 1241-42.
158. Id. at 1250.
159. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 132-33; Franck's Lab, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
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pharmacies as "overreach[ing]."o6 0 Temporarily, the case created a
space for traditional compounding pharmacies not acting like
manufacturers; however, to the disappointment of organized
pharmacy, Franck's Lab was vacated on appeal and dismissed as
moot.161
3. Mukasey Rejects Absurdity Argument and Confirms
Compounded Drugs Are New Drugs
In Mukasey, the Fifth Circuit rejected the absurd-consequences
argument along with the elephant-in-mousehole doctrine, pointing out
that it is not absurd for the FDA to claim global jurisdiction because
the FDA exercises discretion in enforcement.1 62 The Mukasey court
explained that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence guided courts not to
infer an absurd result from a "maximalist interpretation" of FDA
authority when the authority is tempered by enforcement
discretion.163 Furthermore, the court in Mukasey determined that the
factors from the 2002 CPG, where the FDA draws the line between
traditional compounding pharmacies and large-scale compounders,
effectively standardized the FDA's enforcement discretion.164 In short,
the court accepted the FDA's authority to regulate all compounded
drugs, so long as the FDA does not regulate traditional
compounders.165 Pharmacies have described this regulatory regime as
requiring them to "live in sin," where their businesses' viability
depends on "the FDA's good graces."166
The Mukasey court also rejected the argument that the
legislative history behind the 1938 FDCA shows that Congress did not
intend the statute to cover pharmacies.167 The pharmacies cited
legislative statements to show that Congress only intended to cover
manufacturers.168 For instance, one U.S. Representative stated,
"Pharmacists are licensed to compound and dispense drugs . . . . But

there is no such control to prevent incompetent drug manufacturers
160. Franck's Lab, 816 F. Supp. 2d. at 1250.
161. Id., vacated appeal dismissed, United States v. Frank's Lab, Inc., No. 11-15350-BB
(11th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012); see also Joint Motion to Vacate and Dismiss as Moot at 3, Franck's Lab,
816 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (No. 11-15350-BB), available at http://www.hpm.com/pdflblog/
Francks%20Motion%20to%2ODismiss%2OAppeal.pdf.
162. Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 399 (5th Cir. 2008).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 400.
167. Id. at 397.
168. Id.
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from marketing any kind of lethal poison." 69 Another statement from
testimony at a Senate subcommittee hearing explained, "Regulations
governing .. . the practice of pharmacy by pharmacists are very strict,
but the privileges of unlicensed persons operating outside of
pharmacies are so extensive that the public enjoys little protection in
the matter of sales of packaged medicines." 170 However, the court in
Mukasey said the statements only showed Congressional intent to
regulate drug manufacturing, not intent to exempt pharmacies per
se. 17 1 The court explained that these statements are consistent with
the FDA drawing the line between small-scale and large-scale
compounders and deciding to regulate the latter. 72 Furthermore, the
court explained that "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the
principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils"-here, pharmacies
that function as drug manufacturers. 173
In sum, none of the main arguments raised by pharmacies
have merit. First, pharmacies cite Gonzales to argue that compounded
drugs are per se exempt from the definition of new drug because the
FDCA pertains to registered manufacturers and not licensed
pharmacies.174 However, Gonzales relied on conclusory arguments and
has since been overturned. 75 Second, pharmacies may cite Franck's
Lab to invoke the elephants-in-mousehole doctrine and argue that a
space exists for traditional compounding pharmacies that the FDA
cannot reach.176 However, Franck's Lab made clear that the space it
created did not protect large-scale compounders, and regardless, the
case was vacated on appeal.177 Thus, pharmacies are most likely stuck
with Mukasey, whereby pharmacies 'live in sin" and the FDA's global
jurisdiction is only tempered by its enforcement discretion.178 Of
course, firms in the Fifth Circuit that meet the traditionalcompounder prerequisites for the FDAMA exemption avoid the
watchful eye of FDA global jurisdiction.179 Either way, under global
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Gonzales, 451 F. Supp. 2d 854, 856 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
175. Id. at 858; see also Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 408-09.
176. 816 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
177. Id., vacated appeal dismissed, United States v. Frank's Lab, Inc., No. 11-15350-BB
(11th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012); see also Joint Motion to Vacate and Dismiss as Moot at 3, Franck'sLab,
816 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (No. 11-15350-BB), available at http://www.hpm.com/pdf/blog/
Francks%20Motion%20to%20Dismiss%2oAppeal.pdf.
178. Mukasey, 536 F.3d at 399.
179. Id. at 408-09.
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jurisdiction with enforcement discretion or with a narrow traditionalcompounder exemption, it is clear that large-scale compounded drugs
fall under the definition of new drug and can be regulated by the FDA.
B. Exemptions from Inspection and RegistrationRequirements Show
the FDCA Draws a Line Between TraditionalCompounding
Pharmaciesand Large-Scale Compounders
Additional FDCA provisions show that the statute authorizes
the FDA to regulate pirate manufacturers in particular. While the
definition of new drug suggests that the FDA has global jurisdiction
over compounded drugs, the only two provisions in the FDCA that
directly reference "compounding"-the inspection and registration
provisions' 80-show
Congress's intention to create a space for
traditional compounding pharmacies and to still allow the FDA to
regulate large-scale compounders. These inspection and registration
provisions were enacted in 1962 and remain good law in all
jurisdictions. 8 1 The inspection provisions authorize the FDA:
[T]o enter, at reasonable times, any factory, warehouse, or establishment in
which ... drugs .. . are manufactured, processed, packed, or held, for introduction into
interstate commerce [and] to inspect, at reasonable times and within reasonable limits
and in a reasonable manner, such factory, warehouse, establishment ... and all
pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished materials, containers, and labeling
therein.182

The statute then explains that the FDA can inspect "all things therein
(including records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities)
bearing on whether . . . drugs . . . are adulterated or misbranded

within the meaning of this chapter."183 However, this records provision
is followed by an exemption provision, § 374(a)(2)(A), excluding
"pharmacies which maintain establishments in conformance with any
applicable local laws" and "which do not .

.

. manufacture, prepare,

propagate, compound, or process drugs or devices for sale other than
in the regular course of their business of dispensing or selling drugs or
devices at retail."'8
In Wedgewood Village Pharmacy v. United States, the Third
Circuit analyzed this language and emphatically held that the FDCA
authorizes FDA inspections of pharmacies.185 The pharmacy in that
180. 21 U.S.C. §§ 374(a), 360(g) (2012).
181. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 7 Stat. 781 (1962).

182. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a).
183. Id.
184. Id. § 374(a)(2)(A).
185. 421 F.3d 263, 270 (3d Cir. 2005).
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case claimed that pharmacies were completely exempt from all FDA
inspections because it viewed the exemption in § 374(a)(2)(A) as allencompassing. 186 But the Third Circuit explained that if pharmacies
meet the prerequisites for the exemption, then they are only exempted
from enhanced records inspections and are still subject to the FDA's
general inspection authority over "any factory, warehouse, or
establishment in which .

. drugs . . . are manufactured, processed,

.

packed, or held, for introduction into interstate commerce."187 The
court emphasized that pharmacies did not receive a categorical
exemption by saying, "It is therefore clear that the text of §
374(a) authorizes the FDA to inspect pharmacies."1 88
Furthermore, the Third Circuit held that the pharmacy did not
meet the prerequisites of the narrow exemption because it was
functioning like a manufacturer rather than a traditional
compounding pharmacy.189 To receive the exemption under §
374(a)(2)(A) the pharmacy must not "compound .

..

drugs or devices

for sale other than in the regular course of their business of dispensing
or selling drugs or devices at retail."1 90 The court agreed with the FDA
that since the pharmacy was selling large volumes of drugs without
specific prescriptions for individual patients, it failed to meet the
condition that it only compound in the regular course of dispensing or
selling drugs at retail. 91 The court rejected the pharmacy's view that
the volume of compounding was immaterial; otherwise, "much of the
FDCA would become a nullity" because a pharmacy "could essentially
act as a commercial drug manufacturer and totally circumvent the
approval requirements of the FDCA."192 Thus, although traditional
compounding pharmacies are exempted from enhanced records
inspections, a pharmacy that functions as a manufacturer receives no
exemption and is subject to inspection at the discretion of the FDA.
The second provision in the FDCA that clearly references
compounding pharmacies is an exemption for certain pharmacies from
the FDA's registration requirement.193 The registration requirement
in § 510 of the FDCA requires that "every person upon first engaging
in the manufacture, preparation, propagation, compounding, or
processing of a drug
186.
187.
188.
189.

.

.

.

shall immediately register with the

Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 274.

190. 21 U.S.C. § 374(a)(2)(A) (2012).
191. Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy,421 F.3d at 274.
192, Id.
193. 21 U.S.C.

§ 360(g).
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including "pharmacies . . . which do

not .. . compound, or process drugs for sale other than in the regular
course of their business of dispensing or selling drugs at retail."195 The
prerequisites for the registration exemption mirror those of the
enhanced records-inspection exemption. 96 Due to this parallelism, the
reasoning of Wedgewood should apply here as well. Accordingly,
pharmacies that function as manufacturers, through selling large
volumes of medication without prescriptions or through selling drugs
to another pharmacy at wholesale, will not satisfy the prerequisite to
only sell drugs at retail in the regular course of business.1 97
The conclusion from analyzing the FDCA's definition of new
drug is that there is no general exemption for compounding
pharmacies from the FDCA. Also, the analysis shows the narrow
inspection and registration exemptions do not apply when a pharmacy
is functioning as a manufacturer. The CEO of the International
Academy of Compounding Pharmacists reached a similar conclusion
in a statement prepared for the same Senate Hearing where FDA
Commissioner Hamburg was interrogated: "In short, a pharmacy
engaged in manufacturing is subject to the same laws, inspections,
restrictions, and penalties as a commercial drug manufacturer."198
IV. A TRANSPARENT SOLUTION: THE FDA MUST EXERCISE ITS
AUTHORITY OVER COMPOUNDING PHARMACIES ACTING AS
MANUFACTURERS THROUGH AGGRESSIVE AND CONSISTENT
ENFORCEMENT

In reaction to the 2012 meningitis outbreak, Congress, the
FDA, public health officials, and many citizens called for a new statute
to clarify the authority of the FDA over compounding pharmacies. 99
Demands for legislation are a common reaction to crises. 200
Commissioner Hamburg testified that the FDA itself seeks a
"legislative framework" to pursue compounding pharmacies acting as

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
crisis.").

Id.
Id.

§ 360(c).
§ 360(g).

Fink, supra note 12, at 107.
See Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy, 421 F.3d at 274; Fink, supra note 12, at 107.
INT'L ACAD. OF COMPOUNDING PHARMACISTS, supra note 13, at 15.
Senate Hearing, supra note 29.
Outterson, supra note 25 ("Food and Drug Administration ... rules are often forged in
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manufacturers. 201 In actuality, within the current framework, the
FDA already maintains authority over pirate manufacturers. On first
inspection, the existing regulatory and statutory framework-multiple
amendments to the FDCA, the Supreme Court invalidating statutory
provisions based on First Amendment violations, a circuit split over
severability, and multiple guidance documents from the FDA-could
feel like trying to see through one of NECC's murky vials. However,
this Note has demonstrated that the FDA maintains authority over
large-scale compounding pharmacies and, therefore, no new
legislation is required.
The 1938 FDCA and its subsequent amendments in 1962 and
1997 authorize the FDA to take enforcement actions against drug
manufacturers that are operating under the guise of pharmacy
compounders. 202 Under either the FDAMA (in the Fifth Circuit) or the
2002 CPG (everywhere else), the FDA can "draw a line between smallscale compounding and large-scale drug manufacturing." 203 The text of
the FDCA shows that compounded drugs are new drugs, while
creating a space for traditional compounding pharmacies through
exemptions from registration and inspection requirements. 20 4 The
FDAMA creates a safe harbor from the application, adulteration, and
misbranding provisions for new drugs if and only if a pharmacy
operates as a traditional compounding pharmacy. 205 This reinforces
the view that "Congress intended that the FDCA, both in its original
form and as amended, allow the FDA broad enforcement powers to
fulfill its mandate that it protect the public from unsafe
medication." 206
There is evidence that the FDA abdicated its responsibility in
regulating NECC and preventing the 2012 meningitis outbreak. The
FDA's call for a new statute should be viewed through this lens. 207
Before the meningitis outbreak, the FDA repeatedly asserted in
warning letters and lawsuits that it had clear authority over

201. Senate Hearing, supra note 29 (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r, Food &
Drug Administration).
202. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-450 (2012).
203. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 358 (2002).
204. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 374(a), 360(g).
205. Id. § 353a.
206. In re Establishment Inspection of: Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d
525, 549 (D.N.J. 2003).
207. FDA Warning Letter to New England Compounding Center, supra note 10.
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compounding pharmacies. 208 After the outbreak, the FDA retreated
from this assertive stance and claimed its authority was ambiguous. 2 09
This change in position should not be shocking given that the
FDA sent a warning letter to NECC in 2006, which raised similar
concerns as those that ultimately led to the outbreak. 210 In the
warning letter, the FDA warned NECC that "[f]ailure to promptly
correct these deviations may result in additional regulatory action
without further notice, including seizure or injunction against you and
your firm."2 11 After the owner of NECC wrote a letter to the FDA
protesting these allegations, the FDA waited almost two years before
responding. 212 In 2008, the FDA wrote NECC saying that future
inspections would occur and could result in drug seizures or an
injunction if NECC did not immediately correct the violations. 213
Despite these clear warnings, this was the last communication
between NECC and the FDA before the meningitis outbreak. 214 The
FDA failed to follow through with enforcement procedures that may
have prevented the outbreak. 215 After this fiasco, it is possible that the
FDA changed its position regarding its authority in order to provide
an explanation for its failure to take action against NECC.216 In
essence, by focusing on its allegedly unclear authority and calling for a
new statute, the FDA may be diverting attention away from its failure
to follow through with its stated enforcement procedures. 217
The FDA's failure to take action against NECC is
representative of the weak regulatory environment that compounding
pharmacies currently face-a creature of the FDA's own making. 218
208. See, e.g., FDA Warning Letter to Newman Inc., supra note 125; see also Med. Ctr.
Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 395 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The FDA argues that the language of
the FDCA's 'new drug' definition is both plain and expansive.").
209. Senate Hearing, supra note 29 (statement of Dr. Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r, Food &
Drug Administration).
210. FDA Warning Letter to New England Compounding Center, supra note 10.
211. Id.
212. Oversight and Investigations Memorandum, supra note 101.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Letter from Pub. Citizen's Health Research Grp. to Sec'y Kathleen Sebelius, Dep't of
Health and Human Servs. 1 (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/2087.pdf ("Commissioner Hamburg's testimony was evasive, included numerous
inaccurate statements, and reflected an ongoing concerted effort by the FDA to dodge
responsibility for the agency's policy, oversight, and enforcement failures that clearly contributed
to the outbreak . . .
217. Id.
218. Letter from Public Citizen's Health Research Group to Comm'r Margaret A. Hamburg,
U.S. Food & Drug Admin. 10 (Nov. 29, 2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/2085.pdf.
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After recognizing potential public health concerns from compounding
pharmacies functioning as manufacturers, the FDA has repeatedly
responded slowly and inconsistently in following up after inspections
and warning letters. 219 In some instances, the FDA issued warning
letters as late as 592 and 623 days after inspecting a pharmacy. 220 One
pharmacy explained the self-fulfilling prophecy created by the FDA's
weak enforcement: "We assume that if the potential risk to the public
health were in fact dire, the FDA would not have waited 18 months to
issue the [warning] letter."22 1
The FDA can change this situation by establishing a more
rigorous enforcement regime and following up with the large-scale
compounders that it flags through investigations and warning letters.
The FDA should publish its follow-up actions, including re-inspections
and prosecution proceedings, on its website to warn other large-scale
compounders of the FDA's intention to take action. Historically, the
the FDA website did not identify inspections or enforcement actions
taken against firms after the issuance of a warning letter, which now
contributes to a weak regulatory environment. 222 By responding
quickly and consistently to the pharmacies already identified as
problematic, the FDA can immediately assume a strong enforcement
role in this arena.
To maintain a rigorous enforcement environment, the FDA
should work closely with state pharmacy boards to uncover
pharmacies operating as manufacturers. Specifically, state pharmacy
boards and the FDA should be jointly vigilant about identifying
compounding pharmacies that produce substantial quantities of drugs,
operate manufacturing equipment, distribute drugs to many states, or
distribute without receiving prescriptions. The FDA can use the 2002
CPG and the FDAMA enforcement factors to effectively and
consistently draw the line between valuable traditional compounding
and harmful pirate manufacturing.
As the tragic meningitis outbreak of 2012 proves, weak FDA
enforcement poses a dire risk to the public health. The FDA does not
need a new statute to prevent future public health crises. Instead, the
219. Id. at 9; Oversight and Investigations Memorandum, supra note 101, at 23.
220. Letter from Public Citizen's Health Research Group to Comm'r Margaret A. Hamburg,
supra note 218, at 9.
221. Id.; Letter from Custom Scripts Pharmacy to Emma R. Singleton, Dir., Fla. Dist., U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. (Jan. 4, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/ICECII
EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/2006/ucml7l345.htm (providing a complete response to a
prior warning letter).
222. Letter from Public Citizen's Health Research Group to Comm'r Margaret A. Hamburg,
supra note 218, at 10.
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FDA must use the authority it already possesses to engage in
aggressive and consistent enforcement activity of compounding
pharmacies that function as manufacturers. The FDA needs to
respond rapidly to potential pirate manufacturers through effective
inspections. If problems are discovered, the FDA should promptly
issue warning letters. If firms do not correct the problems identified in
agency warning letters, the FDA needs to file injunctions or seize the
drugs. The FDA can change the weak regulatory environment
involving pirate manufacturers by engaging in a rigorous enforcement
campaign. An aggressive enforcement regime would allow the FDA to
stop future NECCs and to "fulfill its mandate [to] protect the public
from unsafe medication."2 2 3
V. CONCLUSION

As this Note illustrates, under current legislation, the FDA
already maintains the authority to regulate compounding pharmacies
that function as manufacturers. Throughout the country, the FDA can
legitimately draw a line between traditional compounding pharmacies
that provide a necessary service and pirate manufacturers that risk
public health through widely distributing unapproved drugs. Although
the statutory and regulatory history of the FDA's authority over largescale compounding is complex, sound legal analysis shows that the
FDA can regulate these types of pharmacies. In order to avoid future
public health crises like the 2012 meningitis outbreak, it is imperative
that the FDA invoke its authority and implement a rigorous
enforcement regime over large-scale compounding pharmacies. Only
through developing a strong enforcement environment will the FDA
prevent the future NECCs of the world from causing another tragedy.
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